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Comment on “Quantum identification schemes with entanglements”
Wim van Dam∗
UC Berkeley, MSRI, HP Labs Palo Alto
(Dated: October 27, 2018)
In a recent paper, [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052326 (2002)], Mihara presented several cryptographic
protocols that were claimed to be quantum mechanical in nature. In this comment it is pointed out
that these protocols can be described in purely classical terms. Hence, the security of these schemes
does not rely on the usage of entanglement or any other quantum mechanical property.
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The cryptographic protocols presented in [1] use entan-
gled quantum states and are called “quantum password
schemes”, “quantum identification schemes” and “quan-
tum message authentication schemes”, thus suggesting
that the security of these procedures relies on the prop-
erties typical of quantum information. In this Comment
we will show that this suggestion is incorrect as these pro-
tocols can be described in purely classical terms. More
specifically, the protocols in [1] only use the classical cor-
relations between the bits of the distributed quantum
states. All procedures are, in fact, only variations of
the traditional Vernam cipher scheme, which has been
known since the early 1900s [2].
The two-party “quantum password” scheme of [1] uses
n copies of the bipartite, entangled state |ψi〉 := (|0, 0〉+
|1, 1〉)/√2. The password is an n-bit string p ∈ {0, 1}n,
and the goal of the scheme is to let one party (the system)
verify that the other party (the user) knows p, under the
requirement that this verification does not make p public.
This is achieved by the following steps. First, the system
selects a random n-bit string r ∈ {0, 1}n. Second, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, if ri 6= pi then the system applies the classical
Not operation,
X :=
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
to its bit of the entangled state |ψi〉. If ri = pi, then
the |ψi〉 remains unchanged. Simultaneously, the sender
applies X to her part of |ψi〉 for all i with pi = 1, while
she does not change the states |ψi〉 for which pi = 0. (As
a result, the states |ψi〉 have changed to (|ri⊕pi, pi〉+|1⊕
ri⊕pi, 1⊕pi〉)/
√
2.) Third, the user measures her parts of
the entangled states in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉},
and sends these outcomes u1, . . . , un to the system. The
system measures his part of the entangled states in the
computational basis as well, yielding the bits s1, . . . , sn.
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Finally, the password is verified by the system who checks
the identity ri = si ⊕ ui for all i.
First of all, it should be noted that the usage of the
random bits ri in the above protocol is unnecessary. The
scheme works equally well if the system chooses r to be
the string 0 · · · 0. More important, though, is the fact
that the same scheme can also be implemented when the
parties substitute the entangled states |ψi〉 with classi-
cally correlated states ρi :=
1
2
(|00〉〈00| + |11〉〈11|). Be-
cause the protocol uses only the classical Not operation
and measurements in the computational basis, it is easily
verified that this substitution gives a completely classical
process that does not differ from the just described proce-
dure. This shows that the security of the “quantum pass-
word” scheme does not rely on the quantum mechanical
properties of the entangled states |ψi〉, but rather on the
classical, shared randomness that these states exhibit.
In similar vein, one can recast the “multiparty quan-
tum password” scheme of [1] into a classical procedure
that uses classically correlated multipartite states. The
essential ingredients of the scheme in [1] are: m-qubit
states |φ〉 := (|0, . . . , 0〉 + |1, . . . , 1〉)/√2, the Hadamard
transform
H :=
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
,
the phase changing operation
Z :=
(
1 0
0 −1
)
,
and measurements in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉}.
To see that this scheme is equivalent with a classical pro-
cedure, it is helpful to consider it in the Hadamard basis
with |0ˆ〉 := H |0〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 and |1ˆ〉 := H |1〉 =
(|0〉 − |1〉)/√2. Note that the phase changing Z opera-
tion equals the classical Not operation X in this basis:
H† · Z · H = X , which allows us to use the notation
Xˆ = Z. Furthermore, we have for the initial entangled
state,
|ψ〉 = 1√
2m−1
∑
y1⊕···⊕ym=0
|yˆ1, . . . , yˆm〉,
which is a uniform superposition of all bit-strings
y ∈ {0, 1}m with even parity. In this alterna-
tive basis, the multipartite password scheme of [1]
2can be expressed as a protocol that uses the state
(
∑
⊕y=0 |yˆ1, . . . , yˆm〉)/
√
2m−1, the Not transform Xˆ
(with Xˆ : |0ˆ〉 7→ |1ˆ〉 and Xˆ : |1ˆ〉 7→ |0ˆ〉), and measure-
ments in the basis {|0ˆ〉, |1ˆ〉} (which equal the combina-
tion of the Hadamard transform, followed by a standard
measurement, which is used in the article). As with the
two-partite password scheme, we see by this limited set
of operations that the protocol relies only on the clas-
sical correlations between the bits, only now it uses the
Hadamard basis instead of the computational basis. As
a result, we can again replace the entangled states |ψ〉 by
classically correlated states
ρ :=
1
2m−1
∑
y1⊕···⊕ym=0
|yˆ1, . . . , yˆm〉〈yˆ1, . . . , yˆm|,
without changing the cryptographic properties of the
password scheme.
The “identification” and “authentication schemes”
that are described in [1] use states and operations that
are identical to the ones of the password scheme discussed
above. Consequently, all of them can be re-expressed
with classical correlated states, and none of them thus
qualify to be called “quantum schemes”.
In 1919, Gilbert Vernam patented[2] the one-time pad
encryption protocol where two parties use a shared, se-
cret, random string r1, . . . , rn to transmit a secret mes-
sage m1, . . . ,mn by broadcasting publicly the scrambled
string m1 ⊕ r1, . . . ,mn ⊕ rn. Thirty years later, Claude
Shannon proved the security of this Vernam cipher in
a mathematical rigorous way [3]. The recent article [1]
by Mihara described, essentially, this same classical pro-
cedure. Both procedures require the parties to securely
share correlated information—classical bits in the case of
the Vernam cipher and, seemingly, quantum bits for the
implementation of Mihara’s protocol. It is true that the
cited procedure of Lo and Chau [4] gives an uncondition-
ally secure way of distributing these correlations between
the separated parties and it also true that this task does
not seem to be possible classically. But it would be incor-
rect to infer from this that the protocol of Mihara itself
is quantum mechanical as well. Rather, one has to con-
clude that it is only the distribution of correlations that
requires the use of quantum mechanics, but not the usage
of these correlations as described in Mihara’s article.
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